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Could the IAF Made A Difference In The 62' War ?? Whats your take??

By: tonysarao | Posted Nov 07, 2013 | General | 331 Views | (Updated Nov 07, 2013 10:40 AM)

Indian Air Force could have changed 1962 China war outcome: Air chief Browne


Source: AGENCIES


New Delhi, November 20: A former IAF Chief Air Chief Marshal( retd) A Y Tipnis has blamed former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for India's defeat in the 1962 war with China, amid a continuing debate on why air power was not used during the conflict. The outcome of the 1962 war with China would have been different had the Air Force been used in an offensive role, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne said here on Friday on the conflict in which India suffered a humiliating defeat.


He said the Kargil conflict of 1999 would have dragged for another three months had the IAF not been used.


"Yes, no doubts about that. If air power was used at that time, the outcome would have been totally different, " he said when asked if the result of the 1962 war would have been different had air power been used.


The IAF chief was addressing the annual Air Force Day press conference.


India had lost the October-November 1962 war, which has remained a scar on the national psyche for 50 years now. However, in recent years, India and China have warmed up to each other, with both sides asserting they wanted friendly co-existence to ensure their respective growth and development.


In 1962, the IAF had not used its combat aircraft and had deployed only its cargo planes for transporting troops and supplies to the northern and eastern frontiers.The issue of IAF not being used in the 1962 war is still debated by military historians and experts and there is no clarity as to why the air force was not used in that war.


Browne said IAF was not allowed to be used in an offensive role and confined only to provide transport support to the Army and said "these are open and glaring lessons we should have imbibed".But this time, I can assure you there will be no such limitation. The IAF will play a leading role in not just against that or any other sector but anywhere, " the IAF chief said.


He said a seminar will be held on October 26 to discuss if the result of the 1962 war would have been different had the IAF been used and "we are convinced that that it would have been different."Taking credit for ending the Kargil war, Browne said, "If IAF had not got into the war at right point of time offensively, the Kargil conflict would have continued for another three months at those impossible heights for our young jawans and officers to be climbing up and losing lives."It is air power, which concluded that war."


THE RATIONALE GIVEN AND THE ARGUMENTS ARE PRESUMPTUOUS. I WILL TELL YOU WHY- My Turn Now -


Be clear about one thing-in times of war it Is the military and the political hierarchy which takes decisions as to the conduct of all defensive and offensive operations .No outsiders are involved unless the Nation is either on the brink of defeat, or is not sure of its own military and diplomatic strength against an enemy who has proved itself to be stronger. Whether use of offensive air power would have tilted the balance in favour of India, at a time when the Army and the Nation were not giving a very good account of of itself, is a moot point and we can make all sorts of conjectures now. May be if we had used the Indian Navy to seal the SLOC's Westwards from the Malacca Straits onwards, the Chinese may have sued for peace! But we did not use the Navy aggressively!


Viewed pragmatically, the Country was not only militarily unprepared to fight a war but frankly speaking the National will and resolve was also lacking. As Indians, it was definitely not our finest hour-we were ready to buckle to soon. England, under the leadership of Churchill fought for more than a year against vastly superior forces -all alone. Sorry, but I disagree if now it is being said that the'Government/Nehru' did not approve the' use of the IAF'.


By no means am I disparaging the valiant effort of the soldiers and the airmen who did what they did to the extent possible.-But had the two Chiefs( that is if they had the resources and the combat power) categorically stated with the confidence and authority expected from them that the' IAF will be used and that is our decision'-let me tell you that no Government, Parliament, Bureaucrat or Politician( Nehru/Menon/Galbraith included) could have had the guts to over rule a line of action proposed by the Military .


In 1962, the IAF had very limited training in so far as offensive support in the Himalayas, high altitude and partly jungle terrain was concerned. There was a lack of operational and logistic bases which could facilitate strikes in the genere of BAS or counter air operations.Yes, some amount of interdiction of supply routes, artificial landslides( in the Himalayan steep and barren hills this can be done, do not compare them with the Alps -that terrain and altitude is different), limited air cover and BAS/CAS probably could have been provided but definitely not of the magnitude to have turned the tables!


And we definitely did not have a deep strike capability nor identified targets in the TAR or the mainland( CATSPAW was a lesson learnt much later) or the munitions and aircraft capable of meaningful and painful interdiction.In any case the ethos of the airforce( then and more so now) does not support direct air effort( BAS /CAS) for troops on the ground.So what really could the offensive employment of the air force have helped, in say the denial of Tawang to the enemy? Bombing airfields in TAR or doing a Doolittle type of raid with Canberras in the hinterland would have not degraded the war potential of the Chinese.


Since independence, all our wars have been of short duration, depth interdiction is of not much relevance to the Indian Army which does not have the wherewithal or doctrine for a protracted war and the IAF's present' we are too busy for the first four days' can cause more grief than joy to land based operations. At that point of time our air defence network, communication and radar early warning network, associated communication system and inter services jointmanship was woefully rudimentary( the last factor, jointmanship, still is inadequate, despite what the military pundits and experts may say) .


Let me add one more thing, even our available air lift and air supply effort was not adequate, the Country had to depend on the USAF and their C130's to provide air lift for troops and supplies . Our fear of'do not cross the LC'( Kargil) or the bleat'do not use the air force'( 1962) is utter nonsense and is a wonderful example of incompetency, lack of confidence, lack of professionalism and will, not amongst the political bosses as much as in the Service Chiefs who come up with classics ones like' we had to fight with one hand tied'!


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