Let's not go ballistic... Review on Defence Research and Development Organization - DRDO

Writing an article on India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is like stirring up a hornets’ nest. Too many people are emotionally attached with the functioning of this behemoth. Some sing paeans to it, some are downright critical of its functioning, or the lack of it. Experience teaches us that nothing in this world is as bad as it is made out to be and certainly not as good as it seems to be. The harsh critics and armchair bashers paint everything in ‘black ‘, whereas the favourite shade of flatterers and sycophants is white. Somewhere between these two extremes lie various shades of grey that reflect the true functioning of DRDO, and it is towards this that the sane Indian public must focus its attention to find out which shade most suits this gargantuan organisation.

Not many people among the general public really know how DRDO functions and my own knowledge about this apex organisation manufacturing products for defence use is limited to reading the various newspaper reports. The fact is that not many things come out in the open. If the truth is really out there, then not many of us can really see it because it is devilishly camouflaged. Just as a blackhole cannot be scrutinized from the inside and we can only draw conclusions by observing the impact it has on its neighbouring stars so also is the DRDO , a blackhole surrounded by the three service wings, Army, Air force, and the Navy. By observing these three defence services we can draw a fair conclusion, or more correctly, we can infer what might have happened. Whenever there is an upheaval or a tremor in any of the service units with regard to production delays we can safely infer that the DRDO has sucked one more project, deep into its bowels that will never see the light of the day.

The Trishul Surface to Air Missile (SAM) was designed to be a multi-service weapon which meant that all the three defence services could deploy it. But one fine day the Indian Air force and the Army suddenly decided that Trishul was a strict no show. Now, there is always a vague explanation given as to why the defence establishment has chucked the project. Obsolescence, delay in handing over the ordered items by DRDO, in extreme cases not able to manufacture the required item at all which normally leads to scrapping of the project. In this case it led to the scrapping of the Rs.3200 Crore Trishul project and opening the doors to the Israeli built Barak missile system. A lot of money goes down the drain and no one seems to care or account for it… not the DRDO, and definitely not the Defence services who maintain a holier than thou attitude towards anything and everything.

Those who are critical of the functioning of the DRDO generally go ballistic about it; it is another matter that DRDO actually supplies ballistic missiles to the defence services. Even in the case of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) delay in its manufacture has been conveniently attributed to the inefficiency and apathy at DRDO. Nobody has stopped to think even for a moment that DRDO is doing quite well in making LCA a reality. “Building a fourth generation combat fighter right from the drawing board is not an easy task even for the most advanced military super powers. DRDO had to brave the embargo on transfer of technology soon after India’s nuclear test. Due to this, they had to develop certain key components on their own which was not envisaged earlier.” This caused delays as DRDO tried to come up with alternative indigenous components. But because of the delays, DRDO received considerable negative publicity. If all goes well, LCA will replace the flying coffins MiG 21s tentatively by 2008, but my guess is a realistic 2010.

Established in 1958, today, DRDO has a network of 51 laboratories. Some say, it has developed into a huge unwieldy octopus kind of network. Some maintain decentralisation is good for developing specific skills and expertise required for the concerned departments and R&D. Also, having separate laboratories dedicated to specific disciplines will minimise unnecessary interference both horizontal and vertical.

‘Vision’ of DRDO:

"MakeIndia prosperous by establishing world class science and technology base and provide our Defence Services decisive edge by equipping them with internationally competitive systems and solutions."

DRDO –Mission:

"Design, develop and lead to production state-of-the-art sensors, weapon systems, platforms and allied equipment for our Defence Services.

Provide technological solutions to the Services to optimise combat effectiveness and to promote well-being of the troops.

Develop infrastructure and committed quality manpower and build strong indigenous technology base."

DRDO’s vision is undoubtedly noble and compelling. The thrust is on self reliance in weaponry and defence systems. Emphasis is laid on cutting down on foreign purchases which significantly strain the economy.

If we care to compare the mission of DRDO with its achievements, it is not difficult for us to realise that DRDO has succeeded to a major extent only in developing quality manpower with a reasonably strong indigenous technology base. Achievements in the rest of the areas are much below expectations.

This is not entirely the fault of DRDO. Being a government organisation it is subjected to bureaucratic delays in decision making, and in funding projects. There is also a lack of structured communication between DRDO and the Defence services. The DRDO makes tall claims that it can easily meet all the requirements of the Defence services which can result in a lot of savings for the country in terms of outflow of funds either in foreign currency or Indian Rupees. Sadly, not all its claims are true. In a field where redundancy and obsolescence happen quicker than the time it takes to plan and build a weapons system, sticking to delivery schedules is of utmost importance. DRDO has generally failed in this regard.

The Defence services on the other hand have been quick to take the DRDO to task on this. The collective services are a paranoiac lot. They tend to be fickle and are often guilty of changing their minds at the last moment putting the DRDO in a quandary. Their contempt for indigenously produced systems is often on display. Earlier, it was easy for the Defence services to place orders to foreign suppliers for their requirements. Nobody questioned the efficacy of those systems. And more importantly, there were kickbacks to look forward to.

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